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Time past and time future
Allow but a little consciousness.
To be conscious is not to be in time
But only in time can the moment in the rose-gar-
den,
The moment in the draughty church at smokefall
Be remembered; involved with past and future.
Only through time time is conquered.
  T. S. Elliot, Four Quartets
In the past two hundred years, from the ‘neos’ 
through the ‘modern’ and the ‘posts’, there always 
have been architects who sought the essence of 
architecture at a fundamentally human and expe-
riential level. It is significant that in a period that 
wavered between eclectic relativism and rigid 
objectivism, a situation still felt today, the experi-
ence of architecture was consistently considered 
as an essential means to architecture. Phenomeno-
logical interpretations of architecture have largely 
contributed to reveal how meaning unfolds between 
the experience of the observer, the architecture and 
the context in which they are situated. Nonetheless, 
the fact that phenomenology by and large begins 
with the individual’s relation with the world has 
attracted criticism.1 For one, Foucault concludes 
his valuation of Bachelard’s work by saying that his 
phenomenological ‘analyses, however fundamental 
to contemporary thought, are primarily concerned 
with inner space.’2 In other words, the question of 
intersubjectivity remains an issue. Though phenom-
enology fundamentally considers consciousness 
to be already with objects, the terms in which 
this community of being can be comprehended 
constantly need to be addressed. Because phenom-
enology is rooted in our individual experience of the 
world, there is always the danger of losing sight of 
the phenomenology’s primary object: to describe a 
common ground for meaning and action.
The question ‘how does meaning arise’ is gener-
ally approached with the assumption that there 
exists a certain convention that precedes any 
communication. As the contemporary semiotician 
Jean-Marie Klinkenberg argues in his Précis de 
sémiotique générale, the flaw of this conception 
is that it only begins with the convention, and not 
with what might have contributed to establish that 
convention.3 To seek out what might have happened 
before the convention was established, the question 
is rather: how does meaning arise from experience? 
The responses to this reformulated question tend 
to be either empirical or idealist – either meaning 
is conceptually created and therefore driven by the 
subject, or it is the existence of objects that gives 
rise to concepts. Between these two ways of think-
ing, phenomenologists have elaborated ways of 
conceiving of the objective and subjective realms 
interactively rather than independently. This inter-
action accepts a double movement between the 
world and our experience of it. In effect, interactive 
approaches to meaning describe how it emerges 
‘in-between’. This in-between, which acts both as 
background and link between human beings, is 
fundamental but very difficult to delineate. Because 
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individual ambition of the homo laborans, who posits 
his own personal survival as an end in itself.5 ‘Reifi-
cation’ comes from the Latin res – thing, and facere 
– to make. It was attested in 1912 as a synonym 
of the French chosification, and mostly employed in 
political economy to translate Marx’s use of the term 
Verdinglichung. This term designated in a critical 
manner the process through which a social reality or 
an individual subject are negated in themselves and 
reduced to the state of things, notably, the transfor-
mation of human activity into merchandise.6
The French philosopher Julia Kristeva describes 
how, behind the reversal diagnosed within the vita 
activa, Arendt was more generally tackling the 
problem of reification:
Arendt sets out to assign greater value, to ‘valor-
ise,’ the active life, arguing that activity means life. 
Nonetheless, The Human Condition also leads her 
to an unprecedented refection of the notion of ‘life’ 
as the nihilistic value par excellence. Vitalist activ-
ism – which brings homo faber to an apotheosis, but 
which also imprisons him within the robotization of a 
kind of knowledge that ‘calculates’ without ‘thinking’ 
– is strongly denounced. Thus, echoing Augustine’s 
thoughts on the ‘negligible’ life, a life not engaged in 
beate vivere and summum esse, Arendt vituperates 
against a consumerism that swallows up human 
life, when that life has lost sight of what is lasting. 
She denounces the cult of ‘individual life,’ and even 
more the ‘life of the species’ which tries to impose 
itself as the supreme modern good, but without 
having recourse to any aspiration to immortality. 
The vital ‘process’ replaces the search for immortal-
ity: this notion is raised up as a fundamental nihilistic 
value. ... In opposition to those currents of thought, 
Arendt offers a life that is ‘specifically human’: the 
expression designates the ‘moment between birth 
and death,’ as long as it can be represented by a 
narrative, and shared with other men.7
by nature it is defined by what is adjacent to it, it is 
difficult to grasp the notion in its own term. Yet, if the 
intention is to comprehend better how architecture 
can be built meaningfully, it is precisely to the defini-
tion of the in-between that we must turn. 
Arendt’s conception of action and reification: an 
architectural perspective
The philosopher Hannah Arendt distinguishes 
between vita activa, life as lived in the worldly 
reality, and vita contemplativa, the life of the mind. 
On a broad historical scale, she describes the 
shift through which vita contemplativa, traditionally 
regarded as superior, is now considered second-
ary to the vita activa. Labour, work, and action, the 
three activities of our active life, now are placed 
above thinking, willing and judging. In The Human 
Condition, Arendt argues that a second Copernican 
revolution has occurred within the vita activa. The 
hierarchy within active life traditionally prioritised 
political action over work, and the concern with 
labour came last. Characterised by growth, metab-
olism and decay, labour is the cyclical process 
which assures human survival and the life of the 
species. Work has to do with our worldliness and 
is characterised by the artificial world of the things 
that we produce and through which we seek some 
form of permanence. Traditionally privileged, action 
is directly related to living among others, it is the 
only activity which goes on directly between human 
beings.
According to Arendt, the work of homo faber was 
the first to rise to the position previously occupied 
by the vita contemplativa.4 However, as the fabri-
cated objects lost their durability, the emphasis 
shifted from the object produced to the means of 
production. The value of durability decreased, and 
the amount of pain or pleasure experienced in the 
production or consumption of objects now granted 
meaning to the objects. Labour had risen over work 
and action. Arendt denounces the ‘reification’ of the 
products of homo faber, pointing to the cyclical and 
81
These three questions have to do with represen-
tation. Dalibor Vesely defines our times as the age 
of divided representation. According to Vesely, the 
roots of the crisis in representation are the ‘tensions 
and conflicts between experience based on the 
continuity of tradition, and artificially constructed 
systems’.11 Governed by economic imperatives, 
architecture is subjected to reification and produced 
like a consumer good. With respect to architec-
ture, reification is best applied to the tendency of 
transforming architecture into a consumer product. 
It is precisely with this phenomenon that Arendt is 
concerned. She denounces the ‘reification’ of the 
products of homo faber and deplores the cyclical 
and individual ambition of the homo laborans. In 
a world governed by economic imperatives, build-
ings are produced like consumer goods, likely to 
be quickly replaced when something better comes 
along. 
In architecture, reification paradoxically arises 
from the dematerialisation of the architectural crea-
tion. Apparently reneging its role as a safe keeper 
of culture, architecture is subsumed in the rapidity 
of changes and dematerialised into an ephemeral 
surface. Since Alberti’s dual consideration of archi-
tecture as ornament and structure, architects have 
approached architecture through a polarisation 
between function and form. After half a century 
of elaborate theories on the nature of ornaments, 
modern architects chose to theoretically do away 
with ornament and form to strictly consider struc-
ture and function. Recently however, it is rather 
the opposite phenomenon that appears to be at 
work: architecture now often surrenders its struc-
tural essence to reside entirely in its ornamental 
surface. 
This reversal can be compared with the ways in 
which different generations of architects continually 
recast their position with respect to time. During the 
nineteenth-century, which we may also refer to as 
the first age of historicism, ornamental theories were 
Kristeva argues that Arendt sought to replace the 
lost tangibility of the objects of production and 
consumption with the real intangibility of our action 
in the polis.8 Arendt is keen to re-cast acting in a 
way that is political, ‘shared with other men’, alive 
and immortal by virtue of being rooted in human 
mortality. She defines action as ‘concerned with this 
in-between [something which inter-est] which varies 
with each group of people so that most words and 
deeds are about some worldly objective reality in 
addition to being a disclosure of the acting and 
speaking agent. [...] [F]or all its intangibility, this 
in-between is no less real than the world of things 
which we visibly have in common.’9
Arendt’s definition of action is crucial as it points 
to the potential intersection between the life of the 
mind, and that in-between others. In this respect, 
three aspects merit further attention. The first is 
that in the description of action, Arendt presents the 
products of actions as words and deeds, implying 
an intangibility which would be opposed to the solid-
ity of things, to the production of material things. 
How can the ways in which action challenges reifi-
cation be circumscribed better? The second aspect 
that deserves further discussion is the suggestion 
that these intangible ‘products’ of action relate to 
‘some worldly objective reality’ and are a ‘disclo-
sure of the acting and speaking agent’. Here, there 
underlies a desire to set action as the encounter of 
a speaking subject and an objective external reality, 
but both these terms would benefit from further 
definition. What makes up this ‘subject’, how is the 
worldly reality ‘objective’?10 Finally, in relation to a 
mode of sharing which is not visible (visibility and 
tangibility belonging to the world of things), it may 
be pertinent to distinguish further between a world 
‘shared’ tangibly and visibly, and another way of 
operating in-between, mediating through ‘intangible 
and invisible’ actions. What concerns us here is the 
evaluation of the incidence of these questions in 
architectural practice and theory.
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past. Indeed, the modern conception of history 
emerged from a general disillusion in our capacity 
to apprehend the world through our senses, and an 
accepted credo that we thus can only know what we 
make. In this conception of history, things are not 
considered for their capacity to endure, but rather 
for their ability to lead to something else, to some-
thing other and better. Memory becomes a weight 
that must be unloaded.12
Today, the revived interest not only in the orna-
mental surface but also in the ephemeral building 
– that is, the building as ornament – is concomitant 
with a post-modern interest in a multiplicity of times. 
Unlike the architects of the nineteenth century, the 
architects of the second age of historicism are not 
concerned with distinct historical times. The times 
they are preoccupied with are the distinct presents 
embodied by each individual’s experience. Histori-
cism no longer applies to the relative roads each 
individual follows to build within history, it is predomi-
nantly concerned with the recognition of the plurality 
of the subjective experiences that form the basis of 
each individual’s relation to the lived world. 
The first age of historicism is not so far apart from 
our post-modernist ways of fragmenting history. 
What is common to both is a certain level of relativi-
sation. While the same relativity prevails, the modes 
in which it can be opposed have shifted. In the first 
period of historical relativity, the architects who 
sought to preserve some form of tradition faced the 
dilemma of negotiating a space for the experience 
of the subject in an objectified history. Particularly 
enlightening in this respect is the work of the archi-
tect Charles Robert Cockerell (1788-1863), who, in 
different ways, sought to open up historical time to 
make space for the time of experience. In his most 
famous representation of history, ‘The Professor’s 
Dream’ (1848), he offered a gap for the viewers to 
enter, presenting superimposed layers of buildings 
in a semi-panoramic drawing that called for further 
involvement. In his archaeological drawings, he 
developed as a primary tool to redefine an appropri-
ate language, and, by extension, to achieve a new 
balance between the structure and the surface of 
architecture. Historicism is a tendency to look back 
at history as a sort of container from which one 
may pick out examples according to one’s needs 
– may they be technical, moral, religious or strictly 
formal– and use them at one’s will. Historicism is 
strongly relative, which does not mean that most 
architects did not have very definite reason to go 
back to a particular period and style. For example, 
when A. W. N. Pugin pressed for a return to Gothic 
architecture, he did so on the basis of strong and 
unwavering moral beliefs. Other architects consid-
ered all styles equally valid. For example, in the 
context of architectural competitions, architects 
commonly submitted a single plan and a number 
of interchangeable elevations. For these architects, 
each style, understood to have emerged from the 
particular conditions of its times, was considered 
distinct yet equally valid. While seemingly contrary, 
these two attitudes stemmed from the architect’s 
acute awareness of the past and the increasing 
knowledge of history. In the first age of historicism, 
architects fragmented the past variously to uphold 
the superiority of Gothic architecture on moral or 
structural grounds, or that of Greek architecture as 
the purest expression of the unwavering principles 
upon which architecture should be built. But as the 
nineteenth century was drawing to its close, so was 
the tolerance to the prevailing relativist attitude. 
When Nicholaus Pevsner describes the pioneers 
of modern architecture, he looks for these architects 
who were dedicated to a single principle. Starting 
with an unwavering dedication to one mode of 
looking at the past, the relation to time progressed 
to a certain understanding of the present to be 
finally driven by a way of envisioning the future. The 
shift in the relation to time did not simply resolve in a 
rejection of tradition but by and large, when modern 
architects discarded the surface at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, they also abandoned the 
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Another project by Whiteread, the Monument for 
the Austrian Jews in Vienna, presents itself as a 
cast of the interior space contained within the enve-
lope of a by-gone library [fig. 1]. As visitors dwell 
on this negative space – the cast being a negative 
imprint of what would have positively been there – 
they realise that the spines of the books are shown 
as positive. It is a cast of non-existent books, the 
negative of an absence. The monument effectively 
materialises emptiness and confronts the viewers 
with the issues of presence and absence through 
questions that are formulated through the direct 
encounter. The personal experience becomes the 
vehicle for the recognition of history, not only a past 
history, but also aborted histories. 
We are now dealing with a number of differ-
ent polarities that are inherently connected. The 
play between essence and surface is intrinsically 
related to the relation between the solidity of tradi-
tion and the ephemeral experience, between the 
objective and the subjective, between history and 
human temporality. If we consider the two eras of 
relativism that frame the apparently stable moment 
of modernity, we can start to trace how some of 
these dualities have been subjected to significant 
reversals. In the nineteenth century, the ground 
for meaning had to be negotiated as some form 
of resistance to historical relativity. In the twenty-
first century, architects concerned with building a 
common ground for meaning have to devise ways 
of fending off relative historicity. Nineteenth-century 
architects sought to open a codified history through 
an ornamental surface that could be activated in 
the time of experience; contemporary architects 
now attempt to re-centre the plurality of experience 
through an ornamental mass where a shared history 
gravitates.
In her essay on the concept of history, Arendt 
draws attention to the fact that at its inception, 
history was closely related to memory. The task of 
the historiographer, akin to that of the poet, was that 
also saved the observers from the task of having to 
imagine, collapsing the time of encounter, the frag-
mented building and a restoration to be completed 
by the viewer. In his buildings, he used historical 
ornaments in such a way that they could actually 
become sited questions. As users move through his 
buildings, ornaments are brought forward from the 
surface, not only inviting questions, but also actually 
interrogating the viewers.13
After the recognition of the failure of history as 
a grand narrative, it has become imperative to 
fragment the past and make space for a plurality 
of histories. Pushed to its limit, this attitude means 
that any way in which one chooses to look at the 
past may be considered equally valid. The impor-
tant question that arises is whether there remains a 
shared space in which communication is possible. 
One avenue is to attempt to operate beyond the 
categories of the objective and the relative, beyond 
the divide between subject and object. If in a nine-
teenth century marked by historicism, historical 
time had to be opened up in order to create a space 
for the individual, it seems as though today, the 
ambient relativism can be counteracted by opening 
the subjective experience onto an awareness of 
history. Rachel Whiteread’s work is paradigmatic 
of this shift. Two projects in particular force the 
passer-by to move from the direct encounter (the 
personal time of experience) to the larger context 
(a shared history). The first project is HOUSE, a 
cast of a low-income house slotted for demolition 
in Hackney, close to the centre of London, in 1993. 
The project is grounded, local, and specific. Occu-
pying the space vacated by an expropriated family, 
HOUSE stood as the material impact of the beauti-
fying policies of the official instances. This awkward 
trace of inhabitation compelled its presence onto the 
passer-by who was then pressed to face the history 
of the site. Who had lived there? Where had the 
walls gone? Why had this been demolished? What 
is happening to our city and its people? Who makes 
these decisions?
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living ‘historically’ as one who acts in the plural, one 
who moves in the inter-esse. Meaning resides in 
this in-between, in the temporary space of the trans-
action that takes place between architecture and 
how we experience it. Essentially, Arendt’s concep-
tion of the imperative to act in the face of reification 
confirms the need to approach architecture as a 
point of meaningful encounter, in this double move-
ment between the world and our experience of it. 
The rapprochement that Arendt establishes 
between action and reification offers possible ways 
to redefine a ground for meaning in the contempo-
rary world. Recognising the depth of our experience 
is to recognise that architecture’s possibility to signify 
is not confined to its ability to adjust to new means 
and new tools, nor is it to the exploration of the 
potential of new materials. In the face of the deval-
ourisation of anything that would last long enough 
to constitute a common ground and in consideration 
of the tendency of our world to subsume most prod-
ucts through reification, action does emerge as a 
rather concrete possibility. Following Arendt, we are 
interested in describing how this intangible action 
can constitute a very real in-between. In architec-
ture, action translates in a space of encounter that 
can temporarily solidify a shared ground between a 
dematerialised architectural presence and a variety 
of individual experiences. 
Peirce’s index and the possibility of meaning in 
architecture
Thrown back to the necessity of defining not ‘how 
meaning arises’ but ‘how meaning arises from 
experience’, we can be guided by Charles S. 
Peirce’s notion of the index. The architectural histo-
rian George Didi-Huberman has suggested that 
the notion of the index forces the interpretant to 
think of the conceptual signification together with 
the sensible experience.17 Taking Didi-Huberman’s 
suggestion to architecture, our contention is that 
this capacity to unite the visible and the tangible 
is principally played out through confronting the 
of the homo faber, a making which had the ambi-
tion of bringing man, who was mortal, closer to the 
divine making of nature, which was immortal. In the 
writing of history, the futility of human works, deeds 
and words were granted a capacity to endure: 
All things that owe their existence to men, such as 
works, deeds, and words, are perishable, infected as 
it were, by the mortality of their authors. However, if 
mortals succeeded in endowing their works, deeds, 
and words with some permanence and in arrest-
ing their perishability, then these things would, to a 
degree at least, enter and be at home in the world 
of everlastingness, and the mortals themselves 
would find their place in the cosmos, where every-
thing is immortal except man. The human capacity 
to accomplish this was remembrance, Mnemosyne, 
which therefore was regarded as the mother of all 
the other muses.14
Appealing to memory and history, Arendt empha-
sises the public nature of the actions remembered 
– works, deeds, and words. The break in the contin-
uum of history is the space where human beings 
think: ‘Only insofar as he thinks [...] does man in the 
full actuality of his concrete being lives in this gap of 
time between past and future’.15 Arendt’s re-casting 
of action within the vita activa is echoed by a redefi-
nition of history as the space within which one acts. 
Here, memory and history may dwell close to one 
another, but in a much different way as they did in 
Antiquity. Now, as action seems to be summoned 
to operate in-between the life of the mind and the 
‘worldly objective reality’, memory may rest closer 
to a consciousness of being and becoming than a 
capacity to endure. We may not be able to produce 
immortal works, deeds and words anymore, but we 
may be able to recognise the depth of our expe-
riences, and acknowledge that our actions occur 
not in a homogeneous time, but in the thickness of 
time.16 This space is thus measured by our actions 
and our thoughts. At the level of history, Arendt’s 
comments encourage the conception of the being 
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Fig. 1: Rachel Whiteread, Holocaust Memorial, Judenplatz, Vienna, 2000. Image courtesy of Gagosian Gallery.
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that take place ‘in-between’ human beings and their 
world. 
According to Peirce, a sign stands for something 
(its object); it stands for something to somebody 
(its interpretant); finally, it stands for something to 
somebody in some respect (this being referred to 
as its ground).20 All three elements are involved in 
representations, but what is most relevant in rela-
tion to the praxis of architecture is the ground (how 
it is represented). The ground describes the type of 
relation that takes place between the interpretant 
and the representation. Peirce identifies three differ-
ent grounds: the icon, the index and the symbol. The 
icon signifies through resemblance and identifica-
tion. For example, one would iconically move from 
a portrait to the physical person that it represents. 
The index implies a physical presence and requires 
the tracing of links between potential causes and 
actual effects. Examples of index are the footsteps 
of someone who has walked in the mud, or smoke 
for fire. The symbol hinges on the recognition of 
a convention, whether a learned code or a lived 
culture.21 Typically, a driver that stops at a red light 
is symbolically aware of an existing convention. Of 
these three different grounds, the index interests 
us particularly. Because the index is related to a 
physical presence, it can be described as a dynami-
cal object, an ‘intersubjective item’.22 The index 
necessarily implies that the sign is situated. What is 
communicated indexically between object and inter-
pretant is rooted in an active apprehension of the 
sign in a particular situation.23
The fact that the index is embedded in the very 
materiality of the world makes it particularly appeal-
ing to the consideration of architecture. To put it in 
the simplest terms, the index is like an index that 
points. It indicates, but of course, to make sense, it 
must point to something, for someone who is so situ-
ated that he or she can make out what the index is 
pointing to. Given the index’s precondition of move-
ment and its inherent ties to an action – whether 
observer with time. The use of the index enables 
the consideration of architecture at the level of the 
immediate encounter, as something that unfolds in 
time, but which already has a history. 
In Peirce’s semiotics, meaning is also sought 
at the level of interactions. Unlike Saussure’s 
semiology, Peirce’s semiotics is not binary (signi-
fier-signified) but triadic (sign, object, interpretant). 
As the third and essential part of Peirce’s semiotics, 
the interpretant can be described as the mediat-
ing instance between what is represented and 
how it is represented.18 The recognition of a medi-
ating instance, in the passage from a binary to a 
triadic semiotics, allows for a shift from a seman-
tic perspective to a pragmatic perspective. What 
is of further interest is that Peirce deals with repre-
sentations and not directly thoughts. The Peirce 
scholar Joseph Ransdell argues that this makes 
Peirce’s logic eminently public: ‘it is of the essence 
of thought to be public rather than private. In other 
words, the problem becomes that of explaining how 
the privacy of thought is possible, not how its public-
ity is possible’.19 Hence, while phenomenology may 
be construed as moving from the personal to the 
shared, Peirce’s logic progresses from the public to 
the private. Given that the publicity of the world is 
encountered in triadic relations, Peirce’s semiotics is 
not limited to the strict consideration of architecture 
as representation (architecture as sign and what it 
signifies), but rather opens up to the community of 
agents at play in the interpretation of architecture: 
the user, the architecture and the larger context 
within which the relation unfolds. Our contention is 
that Peirce’s prioritisation of the public can inform 
a phenomenological approach to architecture. His 
triadic semiotics can take the description of archi-
tecture away from a systematic construction of a 
semiotics of products (representation, reification, 
structure) to focus on how human beings relate to 
their world (communication, dialogism, movement, 
action). Particularly, we will focus on how the notion 
of the index offers ways to describe the interactions 
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Fig. 2: Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz, Monument against Fascism 1986/1996, Hamburg. Images courtesy of 
Gerz Studio; photographer: Kulturbehoede, Hamburg.
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This trace, or index of a process which has taken 
place, stands alone in the now empty site for the 
monument, actualising what it had announced on 
a temporary inscription: ‘One day [this 12 meter tall 
lead column] will have disappeared completely, and 
the site of the Harburg monument against fascism 
will be empty. In the end, it is only we ourselves who 
can rise up against injustice’.26 What is the indexical 
nature of this project? Coming to the place today, 
we find a platform and in this platform there is a 
square inscribed into the ground. Our movements 
about the scene define a time of experience. We 
are anticipating an explanation, looking for other 
cues. As we start to make out the significance of 
the square on the ground, we are thrown back to 
different times: the times in which the column was 
lowered into the ground, over the course of seven 
years; the time of each single inscription which was 
scratched onto its skin, times of which its hidden 
surface must still bear the traces; and of course, 
the times of the events it commemorates, a time 
marked by a number of violently broken life-times. 
We move back and forth between different times, 
going back to a tall column – a recent past – and its 
present future – the column being buried. We look 
at the square at our feet and think of the Square 
itself, what it commemorates. Our movements and 
questions about this index call into play a sense 
of time which is not conceived as a unidirectional 
vector. Past, present and future are summoned, not 
necessarily in this order, and possibly all at once. 
Indeed, we could say of this index, following Levi-
nas’s observation on the trace, that it is the insertion 
of times in space. It confronts the viewer to different 
pasts and their possible or impossible futures.
Architectural index could be fragments of a 
by-gone monument, traces of a building to come 
or the imprints of a removed formwork. These are 
fairly static phenomena speaking of processes that 
have taken place in time – ruination, construction 
or pouring and curing the concrete. What happens 
when an intention is engrafted through theses proc-
a questioning or a displacement – to approach 
architecture indexically is to root comprehension in 
participation. Movement becomes the prime mean 
to comprehend architecture, the key to architec-
ture’s communicative role. The fundamental role 
that indexicality plays within Peirce’s interpretation 
of phenomenon given in triadic relations challenges 
the conception that space can be grasped from a 
single static viewpoint. Experiences of representa-
tions, constructions and situations unfold through 
questions and movements – in other words, in time. 
The necessary consideration of time is what ties 
the index to what could otherwise be approached 
as two realms – the world and our experience of 
it. In allowing the interlacing of these two realms, 
the index, and by extension Peirce’s semiotics, can 
heighten our awareness of how meaning arises from 
a double movement – between world and subject, 
between subject and world. Nor subject based nor 
object driven, the significance of this interactive way 
of approaching meaning is that it involves time – it 
deals with human corporeality and historicity.24 
In the Harburg Monument Against War and 
Fascism, it is possible to discuss some of the 
ways in which the index can call time into play. 
Esther Shalev-Gerz and Jochen Gerz designed the 
Harburg Monument rather as a counter-monument 
– not a glorious sculpture raised on a pedestal in a 
prominent place in the centre of the city, but a disap-
pearing column in an average suburb thirty minutes 
away from the city of Hamburg.25 It constitutes a 
forty-foot-high and three-foot-square hollow alumin-
ium column, plated with a thin layer of lead [fig. 
2]. Originally, an inscription invited the passer-by 
to inscribe their names on the column. Over the 
course of seven years, a period during which many 
individuals did inscribe their name in the thin layer 
of soft lead, the column was gradually lowered into 
the ground. First unveiled in 1986, the column totally 
disappeared into the ground on 10 November 1993. 
Its exposed top was covered with a burial stone 
marked: ‘Harburg’s Monument Against Fascism’. 
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Fig. 3: Herzog & de Meuron, Eberswalde Library, Germany.
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A similar paradox is created in how the building is 
grounded. Coming in contact with the ground in the 
same abrupt way that it touches the sky, with the 
thin edge of its paneled skin, the Library defies our 
sense of gravity. Further playing with our perception 
of what is up or down, the lowest band is covered 
with the repeated picture of a group of young women 
on a rooftop, while the top band displays a series of 
beetles. 
Minimally using a very simple form, a single 
technique of image transfer and a palette of three 
materials, the building indexically questions. It ques-
tions gravity; it plays with what is transparent (the 
punched windows), filtered (the clerestory glass 
panels) and textured (the concrete panels); it takes 
on different lives according to whether it is day or 
night, whether one is inside or outside. By master-
fully scratching the surface of materials, Herzog & 
de Meuron manage to question the pure volume of 
the building and its grounding critically, as well as its 
program and its history. The concrete and the glass 
panels bear the traces of a process which speaks 
not only of an intended selection of images, but also 
of a skin-deep distortion that calls into play a set of 
relations which are fundamental to how we physi-
cally situate ourselves.  
     
There are a number of successful architectural 
installations that work indexically. A less intellec-
tualised example is ‘sliding folding swing door’ by 
the Chinese architect Yung Ho Chang (Feichang 
Jianzhu). In this project completed in 1996 in 
Beijing, a double slit in a wall plane indicates an 
architectural gesture that only comes to life through 
the users’ interaction with it. As one physically 
questions this gap, the plane slides open reveal-
ing a folding door, which, folded open, becomes 
the frame of a swinging door [fig. 4]. In this case, 
the ‘working out’ of the indexical elements calls 
for one’s immediate encounter with architecture. 
To understand what this slit indicates, the dwell-
ers must participate in architecture – slide, fold and 
esses? In this respect, the work of Herzog & de 
Meuron is particularly interesting. In their Library at 
Eberswalde, they have played with indexicality at 
a number of levels. For this project, commissioned 
by the State of Bradenburg in 1994, Herzog & de 
Meuron proposed a simple rectangular form with 
alternating bands of glass and concrete.27 Adapt-
ing the technique of the sgraffito, a method used 
for the ornamentation of facades in Germany and 
Italy since the fourteenth century, they have unified 
these continuous bands by treating them equally 
as surfaces onto which images were repeated, 
like fifteen negatives that repeat themselves sixty-
six times around the building [fig. 3]. Three series 
of evenly spaced windows punctuate three of the 
concrete bands. Sole elements left unadorned, 
these windows are located at the users’ height on 
the three floors of the Library. Only through these 
relatively small openings can the readers inside 
or the viewers outside get an unfiltered view onto 
the exterior and the interior respectively. The glass 
bands, acting as three large continuous strips of 
clerestory windows, only let light in through the 
images the photographer Thomas Ruff had been 
commissioned to select for the building. On the first 
strip of glass, there is Lotto’s Venus and Cupid; the 
middle glass strip displays a vanitas by Pieter Potter; 
the top one becomes the support for Eduard Ender’s 
Alexander von Humboldt in South America with 
the Botanical Expert Aimé Bonpland. The images 
selected for the concrete panels were equally varied, 
giving technological, political, historical and scien-
tific cues. According to the architectural historian 
Gerhard Mack, the images selected ‘portray history 
and science in a skeptical light’.28 Independently 
from our specific reading of the images’ narrative 
however, the selection puzzles. While the consist-
ent adaptation of the technique of the sgraffito does 
unify the form, the images, as they are perceived in 
their specificity, start to play one against the other. 
At the level of its very materiality, the building is also 
unsettling. Engrafted in the building envelope, the 
images distort our perception of common materials. 
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Fig. 4: Yung Ho Chang, Sliding/Folding/Swing Door, Beijing. Images courtesy of Atelier FCJZ.
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users or passers-by who get involved in the archi-
tecture. Both these intentions do not belong to the 
realm of an idealised form that can be grasped in 
a glance but is necessarily a comprehension that 
takes shape through movement, from a percep-
tion to an experience, that is, in time; in the space 
between what is seen and what is lived, between 
what is anticipated and the surprise, in the moment 
of interaction. An indexical approach to architecture 
allows us to approach meaning in architecture at the 
level of the immediate encounter, as something that 
unfolds in time, but always already has a history. 
On the one hand, the presence of the past is played 
out between the intentions of the architect and the 
building’s immediate context – a context that is not 
a frozen picture but a complex world in motion. On 
the other hand, the relations staged and necessarily 
transformed can only be revealed through move-
ments of perception, where every step already is an 
echo of some past. 
Within the usual triads of signs – icons, symbols 
and index – the index emerges as the most hopeful 
avenue for the consideration of meaning in archi-
tecture. In a world that has doomed the original, the 
iconic has lost its most important thread, and without 
a conception of wholeness, symbolic considerations 
are inevitably thin. Because indexical concep-
tions are  rooted in the immediate encounter, they 
specifically focus on the ways in which architecture 
can physically question the user – through traces, 
imprints, fragments, details, surfaces and ornaments. 
Precisely concerned with the insertion of times in 
space, the index retains this essential link between 
architecture in time. Making space for the interp 
enetration of personal and shared times, the trans-
lation of the index in architecture does not dictate 
meaning or reduce it to an endless play between 
signifier and signified: it throws the question back 
to the level of the embodied encounter and hence 
also prevails over the fearful futility of architectural 
reification.
swing the door, question themselves on the inten-
tion behind this awkward articulation, on what was 
there and what was added, by whom and for whom. 
It is interesting that it should be a door, and indeed, 
there seems to be a tendency for most indexical 
elements to be joints, caught in the middle of two 
times, of two movements, of two moments – inside/
outside, up/down, here/there. As such, windows, 
stairs, corridors and even wall sections can become 
key indexical elements that lead to a questioning of 
relationships may otherwise take for granted. 
The consideration of architecture’s indexicality 
presupposes the consideration of materiality together 
with movement. What happens when, intentionally, 
one addresses materials or liminal elements such 
as doors, windows, stairs or passages, in a way 
that directly confronts the user with architecture’s 
materiality as experienced through movement? 
Are not details and ornaments great opportunities 
to communicate indexically? How are ornaments, 
details and joints created, what do they refer to? Is 
the facade itself ornament? Is the ornament a junc-
tion between one plane and another, between the 
building and its context, between the users and the 
program? Thinking around the notion of the index 
encourages the active consideration of architecture 
as representation. Its appeal is in how it takes us 
away from a strictly formal or idealised conception 
of architecture to the actual consideration of joints, 
architectural experiences and movements. 
Translated to architecture, Peirce’s triadic rela-
tion between interpretant, ground and object invites 
the consideration of our built environment as some-
thing apprehended in a dynamical relation that must 
be hinged on the context and that unfolds through 
collateral observations. The index makes it possible 
to talk about making and experiencing architecture 
from the knot of interactions through which meaning 
emerges. The materiality of architecture, its very 
physicality, acts as a hinge between two situated 
intentions – that of the architect and that of any 
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life in what is specific to it, in what is non-animal about 
it, non-physiological’; ‘[...] the revelatory character 
of action as well as the ability to produce stories and 
become historical, which together form the very source 
from which meaningfulness springs into and illumi-
nates human existence.’ Kristeva, Life Is a Narrative, 
pp. 9 and 13.
9. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 182
10. Arendt also emphasises the need to describe these 
realms better. She writes: ‘Since this disclosure of the 
subject is an integral part of all, even the most ‘objec-
tive’ intercourse, the physical, worldly in-between along 
with its interest is overlaid and, as it were, overgrown 
with an altogether different in-between which consists 
of deeds and words and owes its origin exclusively to 
men’s acting and speaking directly to one another. This 
second, subjective in-between is not tangible, since 
there are no tangible objects into which it could solidify; 
the process of acting and speaking can leave behind 
no such results and end products’. Arendt, The Human 
Condition, pp. 182-83.
11. Dalibor Vesely, Architecture in the age of divided repre-
sentation, the question of creativity in the shadow of 
production (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), particu-
larly pp. 175-90.
12. This modern conception of history is very different from 
the concept born in antiquity from a rather hopeful 
human desire to rise in the midst of what was immortal. 
See Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 294-309.
13. See my unpublished thesis: ‘Charles Robert Cock-
erell: Architecture, Time, History and Memory’, Bartlett 
School of Graduate Studies, University College London, 
2006.
14. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (Cleveland; 
New York: Meridian Books 1963), p. 43.
15. Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 13.
16. Benjamin’s understandings of history and memory 
do not only intersect in shock, but also in the notion 
of durée common to both, the Jetztzeit or presence 
of the now. Arendt locates the capacity to think in the 
same gap, and Nietzsche speaks of our capacity to act 
in terms of our ability to ‘settle on the threshold of the 
moment forgetful of the whole past’.
Notes
1. The Peirce’s scholar Joseph Ransdell criticises both 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on the issue of intersub-
jectivity, arguing that the findings of the first were 
inapplicable to a community of beings, while the second 
focused on one’s immediate experience of the world. In 
light of Husserl’s numerous attempts at the definition of 
intersubjectivity through his concepts of the transcen-
dental ego, the lebenswelt and the shared horizons, 
Ransdell’s criticism seems debatable. Yet, that fact that 
Husserl always remained concerned with the issue indi-
cates that there is a level at which phenomenology can 
be perceived to be self-referential. Joseph Ransdell, 
‘Is Peirce a phenomenologist?’, paper published in a 
French translation by André DeTienne, ‘Peirce est-il un 
phénoménologue?’, Études phénoménologiques 9-10 
(1989), pp. 51-75. 
2. Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces, Utopias and 
Heterotopias’, Lotus International 48-49 (1985-86), pp. 
22-27. 
3. See Jean-Marie Klinkerberg, Précis de sémiotique 
générale (Paris: Points Essais, 2000), pp. 100-01.
4. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958), p. 294.
5. Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 65: Traditionally, 
if ‘the property owner [chose] to enlarge his property 
instead of using it up in leading a political [active] life, it 
was as though he willingly sacrificed his freedom and 
became voluntarily what the slave was against his own 
will, a servant of necessity [labour].’ 
6. Le Robert, Dictionnaire historique de la langue française 
(Paris: Dictionnaires le Robert, 2000). In the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary, it is recorded in 1854 to 
mean ‘convert mentally into a thing; to materialise’. 
7. Kristeva, Life Is a Narrative, trans. by Frank Collins 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), p. 7. 
8. Kristeva discusses acting between others, inter-esse, 
and describes ‘Arendt’s conception of human life as 
a political action revealed in the language of a narra-
tion (story and history).’ She continues, elsewhere: 
‘Thus, the possibility of representing birth and death, to 
conceive of them in time and to explain them to others 
– that is, the possibility of narrating – grounds human 
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their experience as the same as the object that these 
people have experienced before’. The index thus refers 
to what can be known ‘by collateral observation in the 
context or circumstances of utterance, or putting forth, 
of the sign’ (p. 382). It is important to recall that this 
is to be understood in the context of a triadic relation 
where ‘the meaning of the sign is not conveyed until 
not merely the interpretant but also the object is recog-
nized’. 
23. ‘Charles S. Peirce on Objects of Thought and Repre-
sentation’, pp. 381-82: ‘the object of a sign is an 
interpretation used to unify contingent identities 
between different situations of indexical experience. 
Reference, therefore, is not a property of the sign-sys-
tem itself but rather of its use’.
24. Klinkerberg describes how the double movement 
between the world and our experience of it is the double 
corporeality of the sign considered interactively. Thus 
meaning arises from experience but also leads to expe-
rience. From the following passage: ‘Enfin, si le signe 
est une condition de la communication, on ne peut se 
contenter de le placer en amont de cette communica-
tion. Il faut aussi voir qu’il prolonge son action en aval. 
Les signes servent à quelque chose: ils permettent 
l’action. Ainsi, le sens émerge de l’expérience, mais 
il débouche aussi sur l’expérience. C’est là sa double 
corporéité’. Klinkerberg, Précis, p. 311.
25. See description in James E. Young, At Memory’s Edge 
(New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 
127-39.
26. Young, At Memory’s Edge, p. 130.
27. For a discussion of this project, see Gerhard Mack’s 
article in Gerhard Mack, Valeria Liebermann, Eber-
swalde Library, Herzog & de Meuron (London: AA 
Publications, 2000), pp. 7-55.
28. Mack and Liebermann, Eberswalde Library, Herzog & 
de Meuron, p. 31.
17. George Didi-Huberman, L’Empreinte (Paris: Centre 
Georges Pompidou, 1997), p. 113.
18. There are levels at which the interpretant could be 
considered to be non-living. So understood, Peirce’s 
semiotics could do away with immediate experience 
– which is obviously not what we are seeking here. 
When we refer to the interpretant in the present text, 
we are strictly interested in those situations where the 
mediating instance is human experience. For descrip-
tions of how Peirce’s interpretant can be described in 
anthropomorphic or non-anthropomorphic ways, see 
Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 15-16; 68-72.
19. Detienne, ‘Is Peirce a phenomenologist?’, par. 12.
20. For introductions of Peirce’s semiotics see Hawkes, 
Structuralism and Semiotics (London: Methuan and 
Co., 1977) and Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1979). See Charles 
Sanders Peirce, ‘On a New List of Categories’, 1868, 
for a basic text on Peirce’s triadic semiotic. 
21. There is an implied hierarchy between icon, index 
and symbol and this hierarchy can be compared to 
the levels in the development of Peirce’s semiotics – 
from the object itself (icon), to the ground on which 
we relate to it (index) and the representation that we 
form (symbol). Within this hierarchy, the symbolic is 
the level at which the triadic relation is complete, i.e., 
where we can speak of signs or representations. Even-
tually, Peirce will come to consider only the symbol as 
inherent to his system of logic, that is, to his semiotics. 
This is as far as we will go with Peirce’s categories, but 
it is important to understand this hierarchy because it 
allows the abstraction of the index from the construc-
tions of semiotics proper. In fact, the index belongs to 
Peirce’s phenomenology and it is within phenomenol-
ogy that we consider it in the present paper. 
22. This has been argued in Helmut Pape, ‘Charles S. Peirce 
on Objects of Thought and Representation’, Nous, 2-3 
(1990), pp. 375-95. Describing more specifically the 
real or dynamical object as opposed to the immediate 
object or idea, Pape concludes: ‘The dynamical object 
is the external object of the sign, an intersubjective 
item that different people at different times locate in 
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